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INTRODUCTION

The advent of new technology presents unfamiliar and increasingly
complex challenges to the law. Legislative bodies are unfortunately tasked
with keeping up with the blaze of new technology and in some instances
struggle to match the pace of technology.1 Understandably, some uses of
technology slip through the cracks, and the law must play catch up.2 Although
these gaps in the law are often identified and handled by judges amidst
ongoing litigation, other legal professionals are advocating for an emphasis
on the proactive revision of the law through innovation.3 However, because
judges are sometimes just as uncertain as litigants about how new technology
affects gaps in the law, a disparate divide exists between ever-advancing
technology and our legal system’s delayed response.4
Complexity increases when a legislative gap occurs in a dynamic
legal field, such as family law. Although family law is well-established in
some places, such as Georgia and the United Kingdom, legislatures have dealt
with advances in technology differently. Consequently, this has led to abuses
of technology that have gone unpunished.5 Unfortunately, when legislation is
outdated, the public bears the true burden of experiencing harm that was
entirely preventable.6
This Note will identify and discuss innovative abuses of technology
that challenge established notions of privacy.7 In most cases, Georgia’s
legislature, the Georgia Assembly, passes new laws to curb innovative abuses
of technology. However, despite their thorough efforts, there is still an
1

Julia Griffith, A Losing Game: The Law Is Struggling to Keep Up with Technology,
SUFFOLK
J. HIGH TECH. L. (Apr. 12, 2019), https://sites.suffolk.edu/jhtl/2019/04/12/a-losing-gamethe-law-is-struggling-to-keep-up-with-technology/.
2

Id.
See THE GROWING GAP BETWEEN EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND LEGAL-ETHICAL
OVERSIGHT: THE PACING PROBLEM 19-20 (Gary E. Marchant et al. eds., 2011).
4 See id. at 27-28.
5 See generally Nellie Bowles, Thermostats, Locks and Lights: Digital Tools of Domestic
Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/23/technology/smart-home-devices-domesticabuse.html (discussing ways domestic abusers use smart-home technology to harass,
monitor, and control their victims).
6 This can include cyber-surveillance, electronic surveillance, cyberstalking, GPS
monitoring, and non-consensual image sharing. See Abuse Using Technology: Ways
Abusers Use Technology, WOMENSLAW.ORG, https://www.womenslaw.org/aboutabuse/abuse-using-technology/all (last visited Oct. 9, 2021) (describing several ways
technology can be used to facilitate abuse).
7 Emily A. Vogels et al., Tech Causes More Problems than It Solves, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(June 30, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2020/06/30/tech-causes-moreproblems-than-it-solves/.
3
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apparent gap in Georgia law as the judiciary’s call for change falls on deaf
ears. For example, Cobb County Superior Court Judge Robert Leonard
recently experienced this conundrum when he recognized a gap in legislative
guidance that restricted his ability to justly decide a complex divorce case. 8
In its evaluation, the Note will engage with notions of privacy novel
to the United States, the United Kingdom, and the State of Georgia. It will
then discuss fundamental differences between domestic violence laws, like
stalking and invasion of privacy, found in the State of Georgia and the United
Kingdom. Next, this Note will analyze how the United Kingdom responded
to innovative abuses of technology, many of which the State of Georgia has
failed to address. Finally, this Note will recommend that the State of Georgia
implement either more periodic updates from the legislature, liberalization of
the judicial branch, or broader, more sweeping pieces of legislation to
effectively combat future abuses of new technology.

II. BACKGROUND
Divorce can be messy, and Melissa Atkins of Cobb County, Georgia
discovered firsthand just how chaotic it can be. In 2013, Melissa worked for
Robert Lewis, who was married to Michele Lewis.9 Michele suspected her
husband was having an affair with Melissa during the course of Melissa’s
employment.10 Michele hired a private investigation company, Truth Fact
Protect Company (“TFP”), to track Melissa’s location using a discrete GPSlocator placed underneath Melissa’s car.11 Upon discovery of the GPStracking device, Melissa sought counsel and sued TFP for invasion of privacy,
trespass to personal property, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.12
However, in Melissa’s civil lawsuit against TFP, Cobb County Superior Court
Judge Leonard ultimately found there was no law explicitly prohibiting
private investigators “from using a GPS device to track people without their
knowledge.13 In his decision, Judge Leonard acknowledged that although the
policy stemming from his decision was morally reprehensible, TFP’s actions
were technically legal because there was no legislative guidance to prohibit

8

R. Robin McDonald, Cobb Jury OKs Secret GPS Tracking by Private Eyes, LAW.COM
DAILY REP., (Feb. 22, 2017, 6:29 PM),
https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/almID/1202779716192/Cobb-Jury-OKs-SecretGPS-Tracking-by-Private-Eyes/.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Atkins v. TFP Co., No. 15-1-5289-53, 2016 WL 8614183, at *2 (Ga. Super. Sept. 29,
2016).
13 Id.
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the activity.14 Ultimately, Judge Leonard concluded that his decision
“represents a classic situation where our jurisprudence and legislation have
not kept up with rapidly changing technology that is widely available and
cheaply obtained.”15 He further recommended that the Georgia Assembly take
up the issue in order to give Georgia courts the ability to protect Georgians’
privacy and avoid abuse of such technicalities.16
While it may be of some comfort to Melissa that Judge Leonard
thought TFP’s behavior was morally reprehensible, this does not explain
whether the Georgia Assembly agrees with Judge Leonard’s assessment.
Presumably, if the Georgia Assembly agreed this behavior was indeed one
that needed prohibiting by enacting necessary legislation, it would have
already done so. However, to Judge Leonard’s assured dismay, the Georgia
Assembly has been silent on this matter. Nevertheless, despite the continued
silence in Georgia, the United Kingdom deems the act of attaching a GPStracking device to another person’s vehicle a prosecutable offense.17 These
varied responses to innovative abuses of technology may indicate
fundamental differences between British and American notions of privacy.
These opposing results require reflection on notions of privacy within the
United States and Georgia juxtaposed to those within the United Kingdom in
order to determine whether the act of tracking someone using a GPS device
warrants prohibitive legislation.
A. American Notions of Privacy
While a right to privacy is not explicitly stated in the United States
Constitution, the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee to a person’s right “to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects” points to the notion that
privacy is an integral part of the American ethos.18 However, this phrase is

14

Id. at *2-3
Id. at *1.
16 McDonald, supra note 8.
17 See, e.g., Kate Lyons, Stalking Using Bugging Devices and Spyware to Monitor
Victims, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 13, 2018, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/uknews/2018/feb/13/stalkers-using-bugging-devices-and-spyware-to-monitor-victims
(describing how innovative uses of technology can be used in domestic disputes); Ewan
Palmer, 'Obsessive' Man Used GPS Device to Track Ex-girlfriend in 'Sinister' Stalking
Campaign, Police Say, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 29, 2020, 10:32 AM),
https://www.newsweek.com/obsessive-man-used-gps-device-track-ex-girlfriend-sinisterstalking-campaign-police-say-1484652 (discussing how the use of GPS-tracking devices
against another individual is against the law).
18 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
15
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typically construed to pertain to unlawful searches and seizures by
government entities.19
With advances in technology, notions of privacy continue to conflict
with innovative methods of technology abuse.20 For example, it was
considered legal for law enforcement to use GPS to track suspects without a
warrant until the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision United States v. Jones.21 In
Jones, the Court concluded that law enforcement unlawfully trespassed onto
Jones’s personal property by installing a GPS tracking device on his vehicle.22
Justices Sotomayor and Alito’s reasoning, however, focused on the breach of
a citizen’s “reasonable expectations of privacy,” which was the traditional
form of analysis when determining search and seizure violations.23 Although
the Jones holding, in its entirety, is not applicable to non-law enforcement
uses of GPS tracking devices, this reasonable expectation of privacy analysis
could be useful in interpreting whether a private citizen, such as Michele’s
private investigator, can attach a GPS tracking device on another citizen’s car
without the owner’s consent.
The Supreme Court also provided some context as to a general right
to privacy in the 1965 decision Griswold v. Connecticut.24 In this decision,
Justice William O. Douglas specified that there were inherent rights to privacy
emanating from the “penumbras” of the Bill of Rights.25 While this decision
supported a right to privacy in the marital context, the Griswold decision’s
establishment of a fundamental right to privacy has been extended to decisions

Barry Friedman & Orin Kerr, Common Interpretation: The Fourth Amendment, NAT’L
CONST. CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactiveconstitution/interpretation/amendment-iv/interps/121 (last visited Jan. 29, 2022).
20 Vogels et al., supra note 7.
21 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (requiring a warrant for the use of a GPS
device by law enforcement on someone suspected of a crime).
22 Id. at 410.
23 Id. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Id. at 419 (Alito, J., concurring). See also
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“A person who knows all
of another's travels can deduce whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a
regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an
associate of particular individuals or political groups – and not just one such fact about a
person, but all such facts.”).
24 85 U.S. 1678 (1965). See also Nicandro Iannacci, Recalling the Supreme Court’s
Historic Statement on Contraception and Privacy, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (June 7, 2019),
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/contraception-marriage-and-the-right-to-privacy
(discussing Griswold v. Connecticut).
25 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 85 U.S. 1678 (1965) (explaining how the First, Third,
Fourth, and Ninth Amendments guarantee certain privacy rights for individuals who are
married, and the Connecticut statute violated the implicit constitutional rights found in
the penumbras).
19
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of a different nature.26 Since federal statutory guidance on this subject does
not currently exist, it is up to individual states to regulate whether the
nonconsensual use of a GPS tracking device is legal.
B. How States Have Dealt with the Use of GPS Tracking Devices
The lack of federal guidance from either Congress or the Supreme
Court provides states with discretion to prohibit the use of GPS to track private
citizens. Interestingly, numerous states have already made efforts to curb this
behavior by updating their stalking or invasion of privacy laws to reflect
prohibited uses of technology.27 While some have gone further than others,
the vast majority of states have recognized the rise in abuses of technology
and have responded to these abuses with new or amended legislation. 28
For example, in 2014, New York prohibited the use of GPS devices
to track another person. However, New York only considered this offense a
fourth-degree stalking penalty, which is punishable only as a misdemeanor
with a small fine and potential short -term incarceration.29 While some New
York attorneys believe this statutory language lacks comprehensiveness
because of its limited scope, other critics worry this update does not protect
against potential domestic violence.30 Although other states, such as
California, have updated their statutes with stronger language than New
York’s, the offense still lacks teeth because it is classified as merely a
misdemeanor.31 The State of Delaware, however, takes this offense more
seriously by allowing trial courts to decide whether the particular behavior of
the person installing the GPS device warrants a felony charge.32 These states
and many others illustrate how the federal government relies on state
legislatures to update their laws to be effective deterrents of certain behaviors.
Of course, there are exceptions to these policies. For example, many
states, such as Delaware, Michigan, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and
Tennessee, allow parents to track their children using electronic tracking
devices.33 Other states, like Illinois, Rhode Island, and Virginia, allow
Id.; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing a woman’s right to an
abortion under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause); Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (affirming the decision in Roe v. Wade).
27 Abuse Using Technology: Ways Abusers Use Technology, supra note 6.
28 Pam Greenberg, Private Use of Mobile Tracking Devices, 24 LEGISBRIEF 43 (2016),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/privateuse-of-mobile-tracking-devices.aspx.
29
David Levine, Breaking Down the GPS Stalking Law, SUPER LAWS. (May 4, 2021),
https://www.superlawyers.com/new-york-metro/article/breaking-down-the-gps-stalkinglaw/9d55921a-fc1a-49f5-b319-604d699b1a7d.html.
30 Id.
31 CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.7 (West 1999).
32 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1335 (2017).
33 Greenberg, supra note 28.
26
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employers to use tracking devices to track their employees while they are
working.34 Some even carve out special exceptions for private investigators.35
In these states, Judge Leonard likely would maintain his decision in Atkins
because there would be specific guidance from the legislature.36 However,
this is unlikely because notions of privacy are rooted deeply in Georgia case
law.
C. Notions of Privacy in Georgia
The Georgia Constitution implicitly grants Georgia citizens a right to
privacy by stating that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property except by due process of law.”37 Moreover, Georgia was one of the
first states to recognize a right to privacy in the Georgia Supreme Court case
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co.38 Following Pavesich, the Georgia
Assembly created legislation securing the right to privacy and enumerated
certain types of right to privacy violations.39 Fortunately, these violations have
been updated, and Georgia has introduced new legislation to grapple with the
advancement of technology.40
While Georgia’s history with privacy laws is lengthy and the Georgia
Assembly actively addresses new technology, the Georgia legislature is not
infallible. For example, in 2019, the Georgia Supreme Court case Department
of Labor v. McConnell41 concluded that the State of Georgia does not have an
obligation to protect personal information.42 Ironically, this decision was
34

Id.
Id.
36 Atkins v. TFP Co., No. 15-1-5289-53, 2016 WL 8614183, at *1 (Ga. Super. Sep. 29,
2016).
37 Ga. Const. art. I, § II, para I. See also Amy Keeney & David Katz, Georgia (US) –
Sectoral Privacy Overview, ONETRUST DATAGUIDANCE (July 2021),
https://www.dataguidance.com/notes/georgia-us-sectoral-privacy-overview (last visited
Jan. 29, 2022).
38 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905) (creating common law
cause of action for invasions of privacy when New England Life Insurance Company
used a picture of Pavesich in an advertisement without the consent of Pavesich).
39 See Anita L. Allen, The Natural Law Origins of the American Right to Privacy:
Natural Law, Slavery, and the Right to Privacy Tort, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1187 (2012);
Michael B. Kent Jr., Pavesich, Property and Privacy: The Common Origins of Property
Rights and Privacy Rights, 2 J. MARSHALL L.J. 1 (2009).
40 Jason Swindle, Georgia’s Tough Privacy Laws, SWINDLE L. GRP., P.C. (Jan. 21, 2020),
https://www.swindlelaw.com/2020/01/georgias-tough-privacy-laws/ (listing some
Georgia legislation that has been passed to combat new technologies: O.C.G.A. 16-993(b) (Computer Trespass), O.C.G.A. 16-9-93(c) (Computer Invasion of Privacy),
O.C.G.A 16-11-62 (Unlawful Eavesdropping or Surveillance)).
41 305 Ga. 812 (2019).
42 Kevin Townsend, Georgia Supreme Court Rules That State Has No Obligation to
Protect Personal Information, SECURITY WK. (May 25, 2019),
35
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nearly published on the one year anniversary of the European Union’s General
Data Protection Regulation (GDRP), which aimed to deter the spread of
personal information to unintended parties.43 Ultimately, the Georgia
Supreme Court decided that the current laws do not require a duty of care from
the entity storing personal data, unlike the GDRP. This is not uncommon,
since most states have not enacted legislation to protect personal data. 44
However, it does suggest protecting Georgians’ privacy may not be a priority
for the Georgia Assembly.
Interestingly, during the 2009-2010 legislative session, the Georgia
House of Representatives introduced a bill that, if passed, would have
protected Melissa Atkins from being tracked by TFP.45 House Bill 16 (“HB
16”) aimed “to prohibit the tracking of the location or movement of another
person without such other person's consent.”46 While it was under
consideration, State Representative Kevin Levitas described the bill’s
necessity, stating, “I think the legislation's good so any John Doe person can't
walk into a store, buy a GPS and throw it on someone's car, just because they
want to know where someone is."47 Of course, the bill included some
exemptions, like for parents tracking their child or businesses tracking their
fleet of vehicles, which is similar to how most states have dealt with the use
of GPS tracking technology.48 Although the majority of other states in the
U.S. successfully passed anti-tracking device legislation, this bill
unfortunately never made it through the State Senate.49
While the State of Georgia has a rich history of protecting its citizens’
right to privacy, the recent missteps in Department of Labor v. McConnell and
HB 16’s failure do not bode well for the future of Georgian’s right to privacy.

https://www.securityweek.com/georgia-supreme-court-rules-state-has-no-obligationprotect-personal-information.
43 Id.
44 Taylor Kay Lively, US State Privacy Legislation Tracker, IAPP,
https://iapp.org/resources/article/us-state-privacy-legislation-tracker/ (last visited Jan. 29,
2022).
45 H.R. 16, 150th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2010).
46
Id.
47 Julian Sanchez, Georgia Mulls Ban on Covert GPS Trackers, ARSTECHNICA (Feb. 9,
2009, 9:15 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2009/02/georgia-mulls-ban-oncovert-gps-trackers/.
48 Id.
49 See HB 16: Status History, GEORGIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
https://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/25877 (last visited Jan. 29, 2022).
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D. Notions of Privacy in the United Kingdom
The United Kingdom similarly promotes an individual’s right to privacy. In
1998, the United Kingdom passed the Human Rights Act.50 This legislation
essentially codifies certain principles found in the European Convention on
Human Rights.51 Specifically, the Human Rights Act gives British citizens the
right to family and private life, which also has been construed in recent years
to include protections against unauthorized surveillance.52 Not only is the use
of GPS-tracking devices an issue when considered through the lens of human
rights, the United Kingdom prohibits this behavior through different
legislation regarding data privacy. In 1998, the United Kingdom passed the
Data Protection Act, which prevents someone from tracking another person
without their consent.53 This has been used more in preventing companies
from tracking their employees without their consent, but this legislation
indicates the United Kingdom’s commitment to protecting the privacy of
British citizens.54
More recently, the United Kingdom adopted the European Union’s
General Data Protection Regulation in the form of the Data Protection Act of
2018, which further protects an individual’s privacy in a consumer setting. 55
The updated legislation “aims to modernize data protection laws to ensure
they are effective in the years to come.”56 Although both of these acts offer
guidance as to British notions of privacy, only the Human Rights Act is
applicable to the behavior found in Atkins. In contrast to Georgia’s recent
stalling of protections of privacy, the United Kingdom’s proactive legislative
efforts demonstrate a commitment to the protection of a British right to
privacy.

50

Your Right to Respect of Private and Family Life, CITIZENS ADVICE,
https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/law-and-courts/civil-rights/human-rights/what-rightsare-protected-under-the-human-rights-act/your-right-to-respect-for-private-and-familylife/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2021).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 See LIBR. OF CONG., ONLINE PRIVACY LAW 200-18 (2012), https://tile.loc.gov/storageservices/service/ll/llglrd/2015296882/2015296882.pdf (summarizing legal framework for
online privacy in the United Kingdom).
54
Id. The Data Protection Act also created the Information Commissioner’s Office to
“include monitoring practices of the online media and service providers, imposing
sanctions, educating the public as well as assisting data subjects enforcing their rights
provided for under the DPA.” Id. at 209-10.
55 VANESSA KIRCH, SOCIAL NETWORKS – THE MODERN-DAY FAMILY: LAW AND POLICY OF
REGULATION 114 (2021).
56 Id.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Excessive Specific Intent Required in Georgia Privacy and Domestic
Abuse Laws
When Judge Leonard analyzed the facts in Atkins, he noted that
Georgia’s invasion of privacy statute could not apply because Georgia case
law requires a plaintiff to prove intent to frighten or torment to bring a
successful invasion of privacy action.57 In Georgia, there are currently four
plausible causes of action when claiming invasion of privacy: (1) intrusion
upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; (2) public
disclosure of embarrassing facts about the plaintiff; (3) publicity which places
the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation of the
plaintiff’s name or likeness for the defendant's advantage.58 The behavior
presented in Atkins would typically fall into the first category. However,
Georgia case law further requires claims in the first category to consist of an
“intrusion upon physical solitude or seclusion analogous to a trespass in
plaintiff's home or other quarters.”59 The intrusion is considered unreasonable
when “such is conducted in a vicious or malicious manner not reasonably
limited and designated to obtain information needed for the defense of a
lawsuit or deliberately calculated to frighten or torment the plaintiff.”60 Here,
there was no evidence that TFP intended to frighten or torment Melissa Atkins
through their surveillance.61 Ms. Atkins also submitted to the court a trespass
claim, which the court rejected outright.62 As Judge Leonard reluctantly ruled,
the act of tracking a person’s vehicle by GPS is not covered by any of the
existing categories of prohibited conduct, and thus effectively falls through
the cracks of Georgia’s civil litigation system.63
Unfortunately, since Melissa Atkins only pursued civil remedies, it is
less clear whether attaching a GPS tracking device constitutes a criminal

57

Atkins v. TFP Co., No. 15-1-5289-53, 2016 WL 8614183, at *1 (Ga. Super. Sep. 29,
2016) (citing Anderson v. Mergenhagen, 283 Ga. App. 546 (2007)).
58 Id. at *3 (citing Yarbray v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel, Co., 261 Ga. 703, 704-05 (1991)).
59 Anderson v. Mergenhagen, 283 Ga. App. 546, 550 (2007).
60 Ellenberg v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 130 Ga. App. 254, 257 (1973); Summers v. Bailey, 55
F.3d 1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1995) (requiring intent for an invasion of privacy claim to be
successful when “surveillance of an individual on public thoroughfares, where such
surveillance aims to frighten or torment a person, is an unreasonable intrusion upon a
person's privacy.”)
61 Atkins, 2016 WL 8614183, at *3.
62 Id. at *5. But see U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (explaining an additional form of
analysis to the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis, Justice Scalia introduces the
trespass test, which states that law enforcement cannot attach a GPS device to potential
perpetrator’s vehicle to track their location without a warrant).
63 Atkins, 2016 WL 8614183, at *3.
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infraction.64 If she had pressed criminal charges, however, the two potential
charges – unlawful eavesdropping or surveillance65 and stalking66 – most
likely would have failed as well. Georgia’s unlawful eavesdropping or
surveillance statute does not criminalize the behavior found in Atkins because
merely tracking Ms. Atkins does not intercept communication, which is
required by the statute.67 Additionally, Georgia’s stalking statute requires the
alleged stalker to act “for the purpose of harassing or intimidating the other
person.”68 TFP simply tracked Ms. Atkins in order to gain information as to
where she would take her car. Tracking another person via GPS is unlikely to
constitute stalking because it lacks the required mens rea of intending to
harass or intimidate.
Moreover, Atkins demonstrates how specific intent statutes can be
narrowly interpreted and applied. The narrow application seen in Atkins
warrants further analysis of whether a specific intent element is necessary.
First, it is important to understand that the purpose of specific intent is to
impose additional requirements in order to find one culpable of certain
prohibited acts or behaviors. Statutes that require specific intent attempt to
segregate a prohibited act from a permissible act by measuring the intended
“social harm” associated with the act.69 For example, the offenses of
manslaughter and first-degree murder are treated differently under the law
even though both acts produce the same result – another person being killed.70
Accordingly, these specific intent statutes are necessary when
gauging the amount of social harm, which is why legislatures consider a range
of contexts and assign varying levels of culpability.71 However, some argue
there are a handful of offenses that should not require a specific intent in order
for one to be found culpable. For example, some stalking statutes, like
Georgia’s, require proof that the stalker intended to invoke fear in the person
being stalked. However, this reasoning may not “capture community concerns
regarding intrusive or harassing behavior.”72
Another statute lacking teeth due to unneeded specificity is Georgia’s
unlawful eavesdropping or surveillance statute.73 At a glance, it seems this
statute would prohibit the monitoring of another individual by GPS, but the
64

Id.
O.C.G.A § 16-11-62 (West 2021).
66 O.C.G.A. § 16-5-90 (West 2021).
67 O.C.G.A. § 16-11-62 (West 2021).
68 O.C.G.A. § 16-5-90 (West 2021).
69 Eric A. Johnson, Understanding General and Specific Intent: Eight Things I know For
Sure, 13 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 521, 524 (2016) (surveying the efficacy and purpose of
general and specific intent offenses).
70 Id. at 525.
71 Id. at 536.
72 Susan M. Dennison & Donald M. Thomson, Identifying Stalking: The Relevance of
Intent in Commonsense Reasoning, 26 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 543, 543 (2002).
73 O.C.G.A. § 16-11-62 (West 2021).
65
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statute instead limits prohibited behavior to observing another’s “private
conversation” or “activities of another.”74 Further, this statute was last
updated in 2019, which indicates the legislature’s willingness to adapt this
statute to new technologies that bring additional privacy concerns.75 In other
words, Georgia’s attempt at prohibiting abuses of technology allows for some
offensive behaviors to slip through the cracks because of excessively specific
statutory language.
Moreover, in analyzing Georgia’s invasion of privacy and stalking
statutes, both include specific mens rea requirements, which limit their
implementation by courts.76 This criticism is not limited to Georgia, as many
social reform advocates argue for more general statutory language so courts
can apply these statutes more liberally.77 The United Kingdom, for example,
has received similar criticism from the European Union for the legislation’s
enumeration of what constitutes stalking.78
B. British Statutes and Extended Judicial Deference
Interestingly, British courts seem more willing go beyond the
specified language in their statutes to prohibit the use of GPS tracking
devices.79 However, this could be due, in part, to social pressures from
“increased awareness” of innovative methods of domestic abuse.80 In the
United Kingdom, stalking laws are composed of a general definition followed
by a list of behaviors that would constitute stalking.81 Similar to American
stalking laws, critics argue the need to amend British stalking laws to exclude
a specific intent by the alleged stalker.82 Additionally, critics in Northern
Ireland argue that stalking reform requires future legislation to avoid requiring

74

Id.
S.B. 59, 155th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2019) (expanding the requisite consent
to all parties of a conversation when recording or attempting to record communications
with included parties).
76 Id. See O.C.G.A. § 16-11-62 (West 2021); O.C.G.A. § 16-5-90 (West 2021).
77 See e.g., Suzan van der Aa, New Trends in the Criminalization of Stalking in the EU
Member States, 24 EUR. J. CRIM. POL’Y & RSCH. 315 (2017) (arguing for a more general,
umbrella protection against stalking in Europe).
78 Id.; see also Killean R. Stannard et al., Review of the Need for Stalking Legislation in
Northern Ireland, QUEEN’S UNIV. BELFAST (2016),
https://pureadmin.qub.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/123538801/Review_of_the_Need_for_
Stalking_Legislation_in_Northern_Ireland.pdf (criticizing the narrow definition of
stalking).
79 Kate Lyons, Stalking Using Bugging Devices and Spyware to Monitor Victims, THE
GUARDIAN (Feb. 13, 2018, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/uknews/2018/feb/13/stalkers-using-bugging-devices-and-spyware-to-monitor-victims.
80 Stannard et al., supra note 78, at 2.
81 Protection from Harassment Act, 1997, §§ 2(A) & 4(A) (Eng.).
82 Stannard et al., supra note 78, at 24-25.
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specific intent and the focus should be on legislation for more malleable
interpretation to be applicable with “future methods of stalking.”83
C. Broader Legislative Action in the United Kingdom
While British laws draw similar criticism, Parliament has recently made
efforts to create more effective pathways to justice for domestic abuse
victims.84 Instead of modifying old law, the United Kingdom’s Domestic
Abuse Bill aims to prohibit wider abuses of technology, in addition to other
“grey area[s] of the law.”85 The Domestic Abuse Bill seeks to “introduce the
first legal definition of domestic violence in the UK, recognizing children as
domestic abuse victims, as well as including non-physical behavior such as
coercive and controlling behavior.”86 Moreover, the new “landmark”
Domestic Abuse Bill will specifically prohibit uses of “modern technology to
track and spy on a partner or ex-partner.”87 While this bill has been described
as a “once-in-a-generation opportunity” by former Prime Minister Theresa
May, critics of the bill point out its imperfections.88 For example, the most
notable omission is the lack of protections afforded to migrant women, which
indicates the work to be done in protecting those of domestic abuse.89
Although the new legislation has its imperfections, the UK’s Domestic Abuse
Bill appears to do more gap-filling than others, as it considers modern abuses
of technology and thoroughly addresses them with effective legal recourse.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, similar to Justice Scalia’s reasoning in Jones, prohibiting
someone from using a GPS tracking device to locate another person aligns
with American notions of privacy.90 However, functionally, the U.S. federal
government relies on individual states to make these specific adaptations to
83

Id. (alluding to the increased ability and new methods of stalking with more developed
abuses of technology).
84 Tahira Mohamedbhai, United Kingdom Domestic Violence Bill Approved by House of
Commons, JURIST (July 8, 2020, 3:01 PM), https://www.jurist.org/news/2020/07/unitedkingdom-domestic-violence-bill-approved-by-the-house-of-commons/.
85 Helen Lock, The UK’s Groundbreaking Domestic Abuse Bill Has Finally Passed.
Here’s What You Need to Know., GLOB. CITIZEN (July 8, 2020),
https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/domestic-abuse-bill-uk-passed-need-to-know/.
86 Mohamedbhai, supra note 84.
87
Lock, supra note 85.
88 Jessie Williams, Britain’s Domestic Abuse Bill Still Leaves Migrants at Risk, FOREIGN
POL’Y: ARGUMENT (Aug. 26, 2020, 4:48 PM),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/26/britain-domestic-abuse-bill-still-leave-womenmigrants-risk-hostile-environment-boris-johnson/.
89 Id.
90 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412 (2012).
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their legislation. The majority of other jurisdictions in the U.S. have passed
legislation that bans private citizens from being able to spy on other citizens
using GPS-tracking devices, but Georgia failed to act accordingly when HB
16 of the 2009-2010 Georgia Assembly did not pass. Other jurisdictions
outside the U.S. with similar notions of privacy, like the United Kingdom,
have not only amended existing legislation, but they have also passed broader
legislation that aims to deter abuses of technology, like the Domestic Abuse
Bill of 2020. Moreover, Georgia’s silence on the use of GPS-tracking devices
between private citizens will likely become more apparent as the use of GPSlocating devices enter the mainstream, as evidenced by Apple’s introduction
of the AirTag.91 The advancement of technology will only further complicate
the use of GPS-tracking devices and build onto the continuously accumulating
mound of litigation surrounding the use of GPS-tracking devices.92
Therefore, the Georgia Assembly has a few options to effectively
protect its citizens from abuses of technology. First, the Georgia Assembly
can adopt sweeping legislation, like the United Kingdom’s Domestic Abuse
Bill, which would provide the most protection for its citizens. However, this
may not be popular among lawmakers because of a lack of funding,
particularly after the COVID-19 pandemic that forced Georgia to reduce their
spending by 14%.93 It could also adopt simpler legislation, like reviving HB
16 of the 2009-2010 Legislative Session.94 This may require less overhaul of
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But see Violet Blue, Apple AirTag Has Built-in Anti-Stalking Tech POPULAR SCI. (Apr.
24, 2021), https://www.popsci.com/story/technology/apple-airtag-anti-stalking-privacytech/. An example of the anti-stalking function is when “an AirTag separated from its
owner for an extended period of time [the AirTag] will play a sound when moved to draw
attention to it.” The anti-stalking function is evidence of corporations protecting the
privacy of individual citizens, even when their governments fail to do so.
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Although GPS-tracking devices are hardly considered cutting-edge technology, they
continue to present issues in Georgia courtrooms. See Greg Land, Case That Generated
$11M Settlement Sparks New Lawsuit Targeting Baker Donelson, AmFam Insurance,
THE DAILY REP. (July 21, 2021, 5:56 PM),
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Plaintiff during the course of litigation, which the private investigator claims to be “legal
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Pandemic, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (May 3, 2020),
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Georgia legislation, but the Georgia Assembly would still have to ensure that
the 2009 language is aggressive enough to tackle 2022 technology.
Georgia’s second option is to modify its statutes to be more general,
like how the EU recommended to its member nations.95 This option gives the
judicial branch greater deference in applying more ambiguous statutes.
Contrastingly, this very reasoning may draw criticism from those who think
judicial deference is something to be contained in an attempt to mitigate
judges from legislating from the bench.
Georgia’s third option would be to update its laws by including
specific language to curb abuses of technology, while also giving more
deference to the judicial branch, similar to how Delaware has dealt with the
increase in technology.96 This would take little resources and would give
courts the tools necessary to deter reprehensible abuses of technology,
including GPS-tracking by private citizens. This expanded reach for the courts
would allow greater deference in situations where the legislature could not
account for the advances of technology and would allow for more flexibility
for Georgia courts. After modifying the legislation to be more encompassing
of developing technology, the State of Georgia would be better equipped to
protect its citizens from a myriad of technology abuses that have not been
conceived yet.
While it is understandable, and even expected, for there to be gaps in
the law, it is imperative these issues be addressed by the legislature in a timely
manner. 97 This is even more necessary when gaps in the law are explicitly
pointed out by Georgia judges, like Judge Leonard, to better protect Georgians
and their right to privacy from ever-invasive waves of technology.

highlights the importance of protecting Georgians’ right to privacy, which has
increasingly come under fire as GPS-tracking devices enter the commercial mainstream.
95 Stannard et al., supra note 78, at 2.
96 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1335 (2017).
97 It has been twelve years since HB 16 failed and six years since Judge Leonard’s call
for help to the Georgia Assembly.

